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of practice combined with theoretical grounding can lead to deeper overall understanding. The Greek world indeed was a crossroads of culture and practice, and these
twelve essays capture the possibility for new insights when scholars include evidence
and perspectives unexplored in the past.
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Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2017. Pp. 208. Cloth
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This work, originally published in French as La démocratie contre les experts: Les esclaves publics en Grèce ancienne (2015), is the first book-length treatment of ancient
Greek public slavery since Oscar Jacob’s Les esclaves publics à Athènes appeared in
1928—an astounding interval, given the importance of the subject. In classical Athens, there were probably well over a thousand public slaves (dêmosioi) who did much
of the day-to-day work of polis administration, handling everything from filing documents in the public archives to serving as the city’s police force. And while the
ancient evidence on public slavery is depressingly scanty, Ismard’s book shows just
how much can be said about it. Admittedly, many of the conclusions Ismard draws
are speculative, and his use of sources is in some instances open to challenge, but this
is, nonetheless, a tremendously valuable book.
Although Ismard’s focus is democratic Athens, he attempts a comparative
perspective and draws on material not only from other Greek city-states but from
throughout history and across the globe. Despite fairly numerous typos, a few obvious mistranslations from the French, and other errors, the book is engagingly and
even thrillingly written, carrying the reader to such far-flung destinations as seventeenth-century Malacca, the nineteenth-century Sokoto Caliphate in West Africa, and Athens, Georgia, during the American Civil War. Democracy’s Slaves unites
breadth with brevity, a combination that will no doubt frustrate some classicists
while attracting the well-deserved interest of less specialized readers. This book is
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not a complete or rigorous survey of public slavery in ancient Greece. Rather, it is a
powerful demonstration of the significance of an understudied phenomenon.
In his first chapter, Ismard addresses the origins of public slavery in the Hellenic world. He identifies an institutional precursor in the pre-classical dêmiourgoi,
itinerant professionals like craftsmen, scribes, and heralds whose services were contracted by entire communities. The transformation of the dêmiourgoi into dêmosioi,
Ismard suggests, was occasioned not just by the development of chattel slavery but
also by the rise of democratic government. Since the existence of professional expertise posed a threat to the people’s collective authority, those who possessed such
expertise, according to Ismard, had to be radically separated from, and subordinated
to, the political community. Jobs in the public administration that required professional skills—the ancient equivalent of the civil service or bureaucracy—were
therefore entrusted to the dêmosioi, “democracy’s slaves.” This, in brief, is the main
argument of the book.
In his second chapter, Ismard surveys the many sorts of public services performed by dêmosioi in Athens and elsewhere. The range is impressive: they were
clerks and accountants; policemen, prison guards, and executioners; mint workers,
marble haulers, and maintenance men. They were even, apparently, in two late inscriptions from Delos and Rhodes, priests (48–49). In many of these jobs, Ismard
emphasizes, the slaves had considerable power and autonomy, yet they were not,
strictly speaking, public officials (archai) and did not possess the rights accorded to
ordinary citizens. At the same time, however, they were not like other slaves. In his
third chapter, Ismard seeks to show that they often possessed privileges that distinguished them from slaves owned by private citizens. These could include, according
to Ismard, the right to live on their own, to possess and bequeath personal property,
and even, in some instances, to own slaves themselves. In Athens, they sometimes
received public honors, and in a few cases they or their sons may have been granted
full citizenship rather than the more common post-manumission status of resident
alien (metoikos). Such peculiarities of status are not nearly as well-documented as we
might wish, and in this chapter especially Ismard is perhaps too credulous: without
much hesitation, for example, he accepts claims concerning the servile origins of
prominent Athenians like Hyperbolus and Nicomachus (66–67). Still, he may be
right to contend that the dêmosioi’s position gives the lie to any idea of the Greek city
as a simple hierarchy of clearly distinct statuses: rather, it was “a multidimensional
social space,” a “kaleidoscope” (78) in which rights and privileges could be renegotiated and recombined.
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The book’s final chapters are its most theoretical. Chapter Four develops Ismard’s thesis that the individual expertise required by some government jobs conflicted with the democratic ideal—best articulated, according to Ismard, by Plato’s
Protagoras—according to which all necessary political knowledge could be derived
from the collective deliberations of the citizen body. The relegation of technically
demanding jobs to slaves served to conceal expertise and thus preserve democracy’s
epistemological convictions. Chapter Five pursues this idea still deeper into theoretical territory through a consideration of three public slaves in Greek literature: the
king’s shepherd in Oedipus Tyrannos, the dêmosios in Plato’s Crito, and the Ethiopian
royal eunuch converted by Philip in the Acts of the Apostles. In these texts, Ismard
argues, the slave who is also the agent of the state offers the key to revealing what
has been hidden and thus to understanding the political and social order as a whole.
Ismard is surely right to argue that the dêmosioi’s existence tells us something
important about Greek democracy, and he is also no doubt correct to insist upon
his subject’s relevance to the crisis of democracy in the present day (ix–x). On the
other hand, there are reasons to doubt his thesis that the assignment of government
jobs to slaves was chiefly a way to hide the threat posed to democracy by expertise.
There were more pragmatic reasons why many public services should be performed
by slaves, and some of these reasons occasionally surface on the pages of Ismard’s
book. As with the royal slaves whom Ismard frequently cites as comparanda, the
servile status of the dêmosioi tended above all to guarantee their loyalty (107) and
encouraged them to serve as a useful check on the power of citizen officials (40).
Perhaps the extensive use of dêmosioi was intended less to conceal the fact of expertise than to maintain the tightest possible hold on public servants—a well-attested
preoccupation of the Athenian dêmos. More fundamentally, it seems unlikely that
most dêmosioi were the highly-trained experts imagined by Ismard. A few public
slaves, like the verifiers of coinage (dokimastai) mentioned in an Athenian law of
375/4 (83–86), may perhaps have required an unusual degree of skill, and some public
slaves certainly had to be literate, but for most dêmosioi the relevant competence was
probably acquired, relatively quickly, in the course of the job itself. With luck, these
issues will be among those debated in the wake of Ismard’s stimulating book.
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